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OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 As Alexander Hamilton famously explained, 
courts have “no influence over either the sword or the 
purse.”  The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
They have “neither FORCE nor WILL but merely 
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judgment.”  Id.  Except for the persuasiveness of their 
decisions, courts can compel obedience to their orders 
only through their inherent power of contempt.  Int’l 
Union of United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 
U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (describing the “inherent contempt 
authority” as a power “necessary to the exercise of all 
other[]” judicial powers (quoting United States v. 
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))).  The 
contempt power, however, is limited to “those instances 
where the court must vindicate its authority.”  Waste 
Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., 893 F.3d 605, 
612 (3d Cir. 1990).  It is “not made for the protection of 
judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public 
opinion.  Judges are supposed to be [people] of fortitude, 
able to thrive in a hardy climate.”  Craig v. Harney, 331 
U.S. 367, 376 (1947). 
 After the Virgin Islands Supreme Court issued a 
writ of mandamus in a criminal case presided over by 
former Superior Court Judge Leon A. Kendall, he 
published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision 
and recusing himself from the case due to alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct.  The Justices cited Kendall for 
criminal contempt and eventually found him guilty 
because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the 
administration of justice and because his recusal was 
pretextual in that he sought to avoid complying with the 
writ of mandamus. 
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Kendall asks us to reverse his convictions.  He 
argues that his judicial opinion is protected by freedom of 
speech and cannot therefore serve as a basis for criminal 
contempt.  As to that novel question, we hold that the 
First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being 
criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion 
presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing 
ongoing proceedings.  Kendall’s opinion did not pose 
such a threat.  We also agree with Kendall that there is 
insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual.  
Consequently, we will reverse the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court’s judgment and vacate all of Kendall’s 
contempt convictions. 
I. 
A. 
Kendall’s criminal-contempt convictions arose 
from actions he took while presiding over People v. 
Ford, a criminal trial of Basheem Ford and Jermaine 
Paris for killing an off-duty police officer.  See generally 
Crim. Nos. 76/2008, 109/2008 (V.I. Super. Ct. July 7, 
2009).  The prosecutor, Assistant Attorney General Jesse 
Bethel, Jr., initially charged Ford and Paris with 
manslaughter (among other crimes) in January 2008 but 
later added charges of first-degree assault and first- and 
second-degree murder.   
The Underlying Criminal Case 
Bethel subsequently expressed “serious doubt” to 
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his supervisor about whether he could successfully 
convict Ford and Paris of more than voluntary 
manslaughter.  Although he later admitted that his 
prosecutorial duties required him not to pursue charges 
about which he had “serious doubt[s],” Bethel left the 
murder charges pending and began plea negotiations with 
counsel for Ford and Paris. 
 On January 16, 2009, Bethel left a voicemail with 
the defendants’ counsel that offered Ford and Paris a plea 
bargain to involuntary manslaughter in exchange for 
dismissal of the remaining charges—an offer they 
accepted ten days later.  Bethel then reversed course, 
claiming that he had offered a plea deal to voluntary 
manslaughter and denying that any plea deal existed for 
involuntary manslaughter.  People v. Ford, 52 V.I. 30 
(V.I. Super. Ct. July 7, 2009) (depublished).  Ford and 
Paris each moved to enforce the involuntary-
manslaughter offer.  During argument on the motions 
before Kendall, Bethel said that even though he might 
“have misspoken” or the defendant’s counsel may have 
“misunderstood” the deal, he also insisted that he “made 
it very clear” that “the deadline to respond [to the offer]” 
was January 26, 2009, and that the defendants had not 
done so.  But a voicemail of Bethel’s plea offer told a 
different story.  That recording “unambiguously” 
revealed that Bethel’s offer was for involuntary 
manslaughter—not voluntary manslaughter, as Bethel 
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had later claimed—and that Bethel had never imposed 
any deadline for the defendants to accept the offer. 
 Based on this evidence, Kendall concluded that 
Bethel misrepresented his plea offer to the Court and held 
that the defendants’ acceptance of Bethel’s offer had 
created a binding plea agreement.  Accordingly, Kendall 
scheduled a change-of-plea hearing for February 2, 2009 
at 4:00 p.m., cancelling jury selection and the jury trial.  
Unhappy with this course of events, Bethel repeatedly 
interrupted and traded jabs with Kendall, who 
admonished him several times.  That back-and-forth 
culminated with Bethel informing Kendall that he would 
not be present for the change-of-plea hearing.  Kendall 
responded that he did not “need to know that” and 
proceeded to schedule the change-of-plea hearing 
anyway.   
 On the morning of the hearing, Bethel appealed 
Kendall’s decision to enforce the oral plea offer to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  And consistent with his 
earlier promise, he did not show up for the change-of-
plea hearing at 4:00 p.m. that afternoon.  After waiting 
fifteen minutes without any sign of Bethel, Kendall 
adjourned the hearing, held Bethel in contempt, and 
issued a warrant for his arrest.  At about 4:30 p.m., 
Bethel was arrested and remained under the control of the 
Bureau of Corrections until the next morning.  At the 
time, Bethel told the media and the Virgin Islands 
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Supreme Court that he had been incarcerated overnight—
a statement that was later revealed to be false when 
Bethel admitted that the warden had allowed him to 
spend the night at home without judicial authorization 
and without the $10,000 bail set by Kendall.   
 At a hearing the next day, Bethel apologized to 
Kendall for his “tardiness” and explained that he was “in 
the process of filing papers” and “looking for a parking 
space.”  Although Kendall concluded that these 
explanations were false, he accepted an apology from 
Bethel and “defer[red]” from any decision to hold him in 
contempt.  Kendall never revisited the issue of Bethel’s 
contempt.  At the end of the hearing, Kendall returned to 
the issue of whether the plea offer for involuntary 
manslaughter was enforceable.  Kendall asked Bethel and 
defense counsel to submit supplemental briefing on 
Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980), a 
Third Circuit case holding that a prosecutor may 
withdraw a plea offer at any time before the court accepts 
it unless the defendant detrimentally relies on the offer 
by, for example, pleading guilty.  Kendall stated that “if 
Scotland is dispositive, the Court will proceed to trial; if 
not, the Court will enforce the plea agreement.”  
 Beginning that same day, the Virgin Islands Daily 
News published several articles about Bethel’s arrest, 
detention for contempt, and eventual release.  One of the 
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articles recounted Bethel’s earlier misrepresentations at 
the hearing about the oral plea offer. 
On February 5, Bethel moved for reconsideration of 
Kendall’s decision to enforce the plea agreement to 
involuntary manslaughter, but Kendall denied that 
motion.  He concluded that the revelation of the plea 
agreement in numerous press reports (including the Daily 
News article) had tainted the jury pool and therefore 
made it impossible for Ford and Paris to receive a fair 
trial.  Consequently, he reasoned that Ford and Paris had 
detrimentally relied on the plea agreement, and so he had 
to enforce it.  Kendall then rescheduled the change-of-
plea hearing for March 11, 2009.   
B. 
Following Kendall’s decision to enforce the plea 
agreement for involuntary manslaughter, Bethel filed an 
amended notice of appeal with the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court, indicating that there was no factual basis 
for acceptance of a guilty plea to involuntary 
manslaughter.  Bethel simultaneously petitioned the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus 
directing Kendall not to enforce the plea agreement.   
The Writ of Mandamus Against Judge Kendall 
In the petition, Bethel made several 
mischaracterizations and also took swipes at Kendall.  He 
claimed that Kendall had publicly “commented on 
[People v. Ford in a manner] adverse to the People’s 
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position as reported in the Virgin Islands Daily News.”  
He said that Kendall “participated in plea negotiations 
directly by . . . mandating what the plea agreement 
should be in its entirety.”  And in reference to his 
absence from the initial change-of-plea hearing, Bethel 
claimed that he had told Kendall “he would not be 
appearing on Monday, February 2, 2009, for the Change 
of Plea, but he did not say and never intended to convey 
that he would not be appearing at all.”  Kendall declined 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s invitation to appear 
in the mandamus action in response to Bethel’s petition.   
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court denied Bethel’s 
direct appeal because Kendall’s rulings were not yet final 
but granted his petition for mandamus.  According to the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court, settled United States 
Supreme Court precedent establishes that the 
“government may unilaterally withdraw a plea offer, 
even if . . . the defendant” promises to accept the offer, 
because a “plea agreement, as a unilateral contract, 
cannot become binding on the parties through the 
defendant’s mere promise of performance but by the 
defendant’s actual performance—a change of plea to 
guilty.”  And although a limited exception to this rule 
exists when the defendant detrimentally relies upon a 
plea offer, see Scotland, 614 F.2d at 365, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court concluded that Ford and Paris had 
not detrimentally relied on the plea offer to involuntary 
manslaughter at the time it was withdrawn.  In the Virgin 
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Islands Supreme Court’s view, Kendall had incorrectly 
and prematurely concluded that the defendants could not 
get a fair trial.  Rather, Kendall was required “‘at the very 
least . . . [to] conduct[] an immediate voir dire inquiry to 
determine if the jurors had read the [media reports] and, 
if they had, whether they could nevertheless render a fair 
and true verdict.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. New 
Jersey, 519 F.2d 1356, 1357 (3d Cir. 1975)).  In addition, 
Kendall had “‘an affirmative constitutional duty to 
minimize the effects of [any] prejudicial pretrial 
publicity.’”  2 App. 16 (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 
263 F.3d 80, 90 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Consequently, “even if 
[Kendall] could have properly . . . found that pretrial 
publicity prejudiced [Ford and Paris], [he] was still 
obligated to employ less drastic curative measures, such 
as a continuance or change of venue, prior to ordering the 
extreme remedy of specific performance of a withdrawn 
plea offer.” 
In issuing its writ of mandamus on May 13, 2009, 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed Kendall’s 
orders enforcing the oral plea offer, vacated his order 
scheduling a change-of-plea hearing for March 11, 2009, 
and remanded the case “for proceedings consistent with” 
its opinion.  The writ did not provide any additional 
instructions to Kendall. 
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C. 
After the writ of mandamus issued, Ford and Paris 
accepted Bethel’s offer to plead guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter, and Kendall scheduled a change-of-plea 
hearing.  At the hearing, Bethel proffered what the 
evidence would show at trial, and Kendall conducted a 
plea colloquy with Ford and Paris to determine whether 
they agreed with Bethel’s account.  Ford and Paris, 
though, stuck to their story that they were acting in self-
defense.  And that story was consistent with Bethel’s 
own review of the evidence: in a 2008 memorandum to 
his superiors, Bethel concluded that the victim “initiated 
a deadly confrontation with [Ford] by threatening and 
chasing him with an ax handle which unfortunately 
resulted in the death of [the victim] by gunshots from the 
defendants.”  Kendall concluded (and Bethel agreed) that 
there was an insufficient factual basis to support the 
defendants’ guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter.  As a 
result, Kendall had no choice but to reject the pleas and 
plea agreement. 
Kendall’s Subsequent Opinion and Recusal 
Rejecting the plea agreement left Kendall in what 
he considered a difficult situation.  Notwithstanding the 
insufficient factual basis for voluntary manslaughter and 
Bethel’s own “serious doubt,” Bethel “unequivocally” 
planned to prosecute Ford and Paris for not only the 
voluntary manslaughter, but also first-degree assault, 
first- and second-degree murder, aiding and abetting 
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third-degree assault, and unauthorized possession of a 
firearm.  That decision to pursue the more-serious 
charges, as Kendall noted, contradicted Bethel’s own 
factual proffer on how the victim died: first-degree 
assault requires “intent to murder” and murder requires 
proof of “malice aforethought,” yet Bethel’s own factual 
proffer showed that it was the victim who “initiated a 
deadly confrontation” with the defendants.  In Kendall’s 
view, Bethel’s continued pursuit of these unsupported 
charges would “be tantamount to perpetrating a fraud 
upon the Court.”   
But Kendall recognized that he had “to follow [the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s] directions with respect 
to the disposition of this matter.”  And having rejected 
the plea agreement, Kendall’s “only alternative [was] to 
have this matter set down for trial according to the 
Supreme Court.”  With those determinations made, 
Kendall promised the parties that he would memorialize 
his reasons for rejecting the plea agreement in a written 
opinion.   
On July 7, 2009, Kendall filed a thirty-one page 
opinion “for publication.”  As promised, the Ford 
opinion recounted the background of the criminal case, 
including the events that gave rise to the writ of 
mandamus, and memorialized his reasons for rejecting 
the plea agreement to voluntary manslaughter.  But the 
opinion also took two unexpected turns, both of which 
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later became the basis for Kendall’s criminal-contempt 
convictions: First, the opinion offered a point-by-point 
denunciation criticism of the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s decision to issue the writ of mandamus.  The 
opinion characterized the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
reasoning as erroneous, “improper,” having “no rational 
basis,” lacking “merit,” and “making no sense.”  In re 
Kendall, S. Ct. Misc. No. 2009-0025, 2011 WL 4852282, 
at *4 & n.6 (V.I. Oct. 12, 2011).  Indeed, the opinion 
went so far as to say that the writ of mandamus “was 
apparently sought and issued to facilitate [Bethel’s] 
blatant misconduct and perpetrate a fraud on the 
[Superior] Court.”  Id. at *4 n.6.  Its issuance, Kendall 
wrote scathingly, was therefore “contrary to law and all 
notions of justice.”  Id.  
Second, Kendall recused himself from presiding 
over further proceedings in the Ford case.  Because of 
Bethel’s misrepresentations concerning the oral plea 
agreement and his continued pursuit of more-serious 
charges that contradicted his own factual proffer, Kendall 
lost the ability to believe “any of [Bethel’s] further 
representations” in the Ford case.  Moreover, Bethel’s 
decision to press the unsupported, more serious charges 
enhanced Kendall’s nagging concern that the extensive 
pretrial publicity would deny the defendants’ their Sixth 
Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury.  In short, 
Kendall said he could no longer “be a party to [Bethel’s] 
egregious misconduct.”   
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After Kendall issued this opinion, People v. Ford 
was reassigned to James S. Carroll III.  Judge Carroll 
held a pretrial conference on July 23, 2009.  The People 
were not prepared to proceed to trial at that time because 
certain witnesses were unavailable.  So Judge Carroll 
scheduled jury selection and trial for November 23, 2009.   
Meanwhile, Ford and Paris petitioned the Third 
Circuit for a writ of certiorari to review the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court’s writ of mandamus and its 
conclusion that Bethel’s plea offer for involuntary 
manslaughter was not enforceable.  When November 23 
arrived, the government indicated that it was not prepared 
to begin trial because it was awaiting a ruling by the 
Third Circuit on the defendants’ certiorari petition.  In 
fact, the Third Circuit had denied the petition a few days 
earlier on November 17.  Judge Carroll nonetheless 
continued jury selection until April 12, 2010, at the 
request of Paris’s counsel because two defense witnesses 
either could not be located or had to be flown to the 
Virgin Islands.  Although Ford died before he could go to 
trial, a jury ultimately acquitted Paris.  
D. 
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court did not take 
Kendall’s recalcitrance lying down.  They had no 
mechanism for disciplining Kendall: in an earlier 
challenge by Kendall, the statute authorizing the Virgin 
The Criminal-Contempt Charges Against Kendall 
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Islands Commission on Judicial Discipline to investigate 
and remove Superior Court judges was struck down by 
this Court as unconstitutional.  See Kendall v. Russell, 
572 F.3d 126, 138 (3d Cir. 2009).  Nor had the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court yet issued new disciplinary rules 
applicable to judges.   
Believing that they had no other alternatives, the 
Justices ordered Kendall to show cause why he should 
not be held in criminal contempt.  That show-cause order 
charged Kendall with three counts of indirect1
                                                 
1 Contempt can be either direct or indirect.  See United 
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 723 n.1 (1993) (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The distinction between, on the one hand, direct and 
summary contempt (i.e., contempt for acts occurring in 
the courtroom and interfering with the orderly conduct of 
business), and, on the other hand, nonsummary contempt, 
possesses old roots in the [Supreme] Court’s cases.”).  
Direct contempt describes “the judge’s authority to 
[summarily] impose punishment, without any form of 
trial, on one who engages in contumacious behavior in 
the judge’s presence,” such as a party’s repeated 
outbursts during a hearing or a witness’s refusal to testify 
during trial.  Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the 
Civil/Criminal Distinction, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1025, 1030 
 criminal 
contempt: 
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(1) Count 1:
(2) 
 Obstructing the 
administration of justice by issuing 
the Ford opinion critical of the 
Justices’ writ of mandamus; 
Count 2:
(3) 
 Failing to comply with the 
writ of mandamus by refusing to 
schedule People v. Ford for trial, 
refusing to consider a change of 
venue or continuance to minimize 
pretrial publicity, and recusing 
himself to avoid complying with the 
writ of mandamus; and 
Count 3:
 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court appointed a 
special prosecutor to pursue the criminal-contempt 
charges and a Special Master to rule on all non-
dispositive motions, manage discovery, preside over the 
trial, and recommend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.  Much like the relationship between a magistrate 
 Misbehaving in his official 
transactions as an officer of the court 
by issuing his Ford opinion and 
disobeying the writ of mandamus. 
                                                                                                             
(1993).  Indirect contempt targets acts “committed 
outside the presence of the court for which some fact-
finding process is concededly necessary,” such as a 
person’s refusal to obey a court order.  Id. 
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judge and a district judge, see generally 28 U.S.C. § 636, 
the Justices had the ultimate authority to adopt or reject 
the Special Master’s recommendations.   
 Before trial, Kendall moved to disqualify all three 
Justices of the Supreme Court because they were the 
target of his opinion’s criticism.  The Justices denied this 
motion, and Kendall’s case proceeded to trial.  After the 
People rested, Kendall moved for a judgment of acquittal 
based on insufficient evidence.  He also moved for a 
mistrial, arguing that the Justices violated his due-process 
right by not personally attending the trial and observing 
the witnesses’ live testimony before making findings of 
fact in the case.  The Special Master recommended denial 
of this motion, and the Supreme Court adopted that 
recommendation.   
At the conclusion of the trial, the parties submitted 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the 
Special Master.  The Special Master recommended that 
Kendall be acquitted on all charges. After considering 
supplemental briefs from both sides and reviewing a 
video recording of a “majority” of the proceedings before 
the Special Master, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
rejected the Special Master’s ultimate recommendation 
of acquittal and found Kendall guilty on all counts.   
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In sentencing Kendall, the Justices ordered him to 
pay a $1,000 fine on Count 12
E. 
 but stayed sentencing for 
the remaining charges because all three charges arose 
from the same conduct.  The Supreme Court also 
depublished Kendall’s Ford opinion. 
Kendall sought review of his convictions by 
petitioning this Court for a writ of certiorari.
This Appeal 
3
                                                 
2 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court subsequently stayed 
payment of the fine pending our review. 
  We 
granted his petition on the following questions: 
3 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court had inherent and 
statutory jurisdiction over Kendall’s contempt 
proceeding.  See 4 V.I. Code § 243(4) (“Every court shall 
have power . . . [t]o compel obedience to its judgments, 
orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of 
court, in all actions, or proceedings pending therein[.]”); 
4 V.I. Code § 281(2) (“Every judicial officer shall have 
power . . . [t]o compel obedience to his lawful 
orders[.]”); Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 793 
(1987) (“[I]t is long settled that courts possess inherent 
authority to initiate contempt proceedings for 
disobedience to their orders . . . .”).  We have certiorari 
jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613, which grants the 
Third Circuit certiorari jurisdiction to review final 
decisions of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.  See 
19 
 
1. Whether the First Amendment limits the 
imposition of criminal contempt for 
statements made in a judge’s written 
opinion and if so, the scope of the 
limitation and its application in this case; 
2. Whether the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court erred in imposing criminal 
contempt on the charges of failure to 
comply with its mandamus order of May 
13, 2009, in In re People of the Virgin 
Islands, V.I. S. Ct. Civ. No. 2009-021; 
3. Whether the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court Justices erred in not recusing 
themselves from this matter; and 
4. Whether [Kendall] impliedly consented, 
or waived any challenge, to conducting 
the show cause hearing before a special 
master and, if not, the propriety of that 
procedure. 
                                                                                                             
Kendall v. Daily News, __ F.3d __, No. 11-4162, 2013 
WL 856433 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2013) (holding that 
Congress’s recent elimination of the Third Circuit’s 
certiorari jurisdiction over decisions of the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court does not affect, at a minimum, certiorari 
petitions filed before the effective date of the 
jurisdiction-stripping act). 
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II. 
 On Count 1, Kendall was convicted of indirect 
criminal contempt for obstructing the administration of 
justice by publishing inflammatory remarks about the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court in his Ford opinion.  
Kendall argues that the remarks in his Ford opinion are 
protected by freedom of speech and therefore cannot 
serve as a basis for his conviction.4
                                                 
4 The ACLU, as amicus, argues that Kendall is shielded 
from criminal contempt by absolute judicial immunity.  
According to the ACLU, “if judges are immune from 
civil liability from third parties even for judicial actions 
done maliciously, with an improper motive, in bad faith, 
or which are unfair or controversial, then . . . they ought 
not face criminal liability for a mere written opinion.”  
ACLU Br. at 11.  We do not need to address this 
argument because it is not properly before us.  Judicial 
immunity is outside the questions on which we granted 
certiorari.   See 3d Cir. LAR 112.10(a) (“If a petition for 
writ of certiorari is granted, . . . the case shall proceed as 
other appeals [do] . . . but with review limited to the 
questions on which the writ of certiorari was granted.”); 
see also Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. 
Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32–33 (1993) (explaining the 
limited categories of “unusual circumstances,” in which 
the Court would consider an issue on which certiorari 
  We agree. 
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was not granted, such as “the possible absence of 
jurisdiction” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
What’s more, Kendall did not raise this argument before 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court or in any of his briefs 
before this Court.  See AT&T, Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 
495 (3d Cir. 2009) (“An appellant waives an argument in 
support of reversal if he does not raise that argument in 
his opening brief.”), rev’d on other grounds, FCC v. 
AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011). 
 
In any event, Kendall would not be able to shoulder his 
burden of showing that he is entitled to judicial immunity 
from criminal contempt.  Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 n.4 (1993).  Judicial immunity is 
a common-law doctrine designed to protect judicial 
independence.  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 759 
n.2 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Constitution provides no hint that either judges, 
prosecutors, or congressional aides should be so 
protected [through absolute immunity].  Absolute 
immunity for judges and prosecutors is seen to derive 
from the common law and public policy . . . .”).  And 
while “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at 
common law than the immunity of judges from liability 
for damages for acts committed within their judicial 
jurisdiction,” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 
(1985) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 
(1967)), the same was not true for contempt or criminal 
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liability, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 n.1 (1991) 
(recognizing that “a judge is not absolutely immune from 
criminal liability”)); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 
503 (1974) (same).  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, at common law, superior courts routinely 
used their contempt power to hold inferior judges 
accountable for violating their writs and orders.  Pulliam 
v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 532 n.19 (1984) (noting that a 
judge to whom a writ of mandamus or prohibition is 
issued “risks contempt for violating the writ,” and that 
“although courts properly are reluctant to impose costs 
against a judge for actions taken in good-faith 
performance of his judicial responsibilities, a court, in its 
discretion, may award costs against a respondent judge”); 
see, e.g., United States v. Justices of Lauderdale Cnty., 
10 F. 460 (Cir. Ct., W.D. Tenn. 1882); Lapique v. 
Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 229 P. 1014 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1924); In re Smith, 83 P. 167 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1905); Pittman v. Hagans, 91 Ga. 107 (1892); 
Havemeyer v. Superior Court of City and Cnty. of S.F., 
87 Cal. 267, 275 (1890); In re Cary, 10 F. 622, 631 
(S.D.N.Y. 1882); Gorham v. Luckett, 45 Ky. 638 (1846); 
People v. Pearson, 4 Ill. 270 (1841); Floyd v. Barker, 77 
Eng. Rep. 1305 (K.B. 1607);  see also 3 William 
Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 8 § 74 
(7th ed. 1795) (“Justices of the peace are not punishable 
civilly for acts done by them in their judicial capacities, 
but if they abuse the authority with which they are 
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entrusted, they may be punished criminally at the foot of 
the king by way of information.”).  This practice held fast 
until codes of judicial conduct and judicial disciplinary 
commissions were created in the mid-twentieth century.  
See Jeffrey M. Sham, State Judicial Conduct 
Organizations, 76 Ky. L.J. 811, 811 (1987–88) 
(recounting the history of judicial discipline). 
 
Indeed, there would be little reason to extend judicial 
immunity to criminal contempt.  Unlike the danger that 
civil liability poses to judicial independence, any threat to 
judicial independence from criminal liability is “severely 
curtail[ed]” by “the limitations already imposed” by the 
exceptional nature of mandamus and the constitutional 
protections for criminal prosecutions (such as the right to 
a trial by jury, burden of proof, and presumption of 
innocence).  Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 537–38 (rejecting 
Justice Powell’s dissenting argument that the “specter of 
contempt proceedings [against a judge who] violat[es] 
. . . injunctive orders is likely to inhibit unbiased judicial 
decisionmaking as much as the threat of liability for 
damages”).  And an inferior-court judge’s freedom to 
disobey a superior court’s order is not the sort of 
independent judicial decision-making that immunity is 
designed to protect.  Accord United States v. Claiborne, 
727 F.2d 842, 847–48 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a judge’s 
argument that separation-of-powers concerns should 
prevent executive officers from prosecuting federal 
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A. 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the scope of 
a judge’s freedom of speech as a sitting judge.  See 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 
(2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case does not 
present the question whether a State may restrict the 
speech of judges because they are judges—for example, 
as part of a code of judicial conduct; the law here 
regulates judges only when and because they are 
candidates.”).  Yet other federal and state courts have 
repeatedly held that a “judge does not check his First 
Amendment rights at the courthouse door, to be 
reclaimed at the expiration of his judicial tenure.”
The Scope of Constitutional Protection for Judicial 
Speech 
5
                                                                                                             
judges for acts involving exercise of their judicial 
power); United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710–11 
(11th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 
1124, 1140–44 (7th Cir. 1974) (same).  With no support 
in history, law, or logic, we cannot extend judicial 
immunity to criminal contempt.  Cf. Dennis v. Sparks, 
449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980) (rejecting an extension of 
derivative judicial immunity because the petitioners had 
“pointed to nothing indicating that, historically, judicial 
immunity insulated from damages liability those private 
persons who corruptly conspire with the judge”). 
  In re 
5 E.g., In re Vincent, 172 P.3d 605, 607 (N.M. 2007) 
(“[W]e recognize that there are nevertheless 
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Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1289, 1289 (9th Cir. Jud. 
Counc. 2001) (Kozinksi, C.J., sitting alone).   
We agree.  What a judge says in an opinion is 
sufficiently expressive to trigger First Amendment 
review.  The judge “inten[ds] to convey a particularized 
message” by explaining his legal analysis and 
conclusions, and there is a “great” likelihood that the 
opinion’s message would be understood by its 
audience—no less than if the judge had published the 
same analysis and commentary in a law review article.6
                                                                                                             
constitutional limitations on the regulation of judicial 
speech.”); In re Sanders, 995 P.2d 369, 375 (Wash. 
1998) (“A judge does not surrender First Amendment 
rights upon becoming a member of the judiciary.”). 
6 We do not decide, however, whether a judge’s ultimate 
rulings and judgments (as opposed to the explanations 
and commentary offered in opinions) also trigger First 
Amendment review.  See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. 
Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 n.5 (2011) (“A legislator 
voting on a bill is not fairly analogized to one simply 
discussing that bill or expressing an opinion for or 
against it.  The former is performing a governmental act 
as a representative of his constituents; only the latter is 
exercising personal First Amendment rights.” (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted)).  
  
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Indeed, as pure speech on 
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public issues, a judicial opinion “occupies the highest 
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and is 
thus “entitled to special protection.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  To be sure, the rationale and holdings 
in an opinion often carry the force of law, but the mere 
fact that an opinion has legal effect does not “somehow 
deprive[] [an opinion] of its expressive component.”  Doe 
v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010); see also Nev. 
Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 
(2011) (“It is one thing to say that an inherently 
expressive act remains so despite its having 
governmental effect, but it is altogether another thing to 
say that a governmental act becomes expressive simply 
because the governmental actor wishes it to be so.  We 
have never said the latter is true.”).  No one contends that 
Kendall’s opinion was not speech. 
Having concluded that a judicial opinion qualifies 
as “speech,” we must determine the scope of its 
protection.  Kendall argues that a judicial opinion is 
criminally punishable only under the government’s 
limited authority as sovereign to regulate speech that 
poses a clear and present danger to the administration of 
justice.  By contrast, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
relied on the government’s broader authority to discipline 
attorneys for speech that is substantially likely to 
prejudice ongoing proceedings and held that this broader 
authority allows the government to criminally punish 
27 
 
judicial speech that poses the same threat.7
As a general matter, the First Amendment protects 
freedom of expression regardless of its content or 
viewpoint and “regardless of whether it is disruptive, 
offensive, vulgar or insulting.”  J.S. v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Smith, J., concurring).  Yet that rule is not absolute.  
When acting as sovereign, the government is empowered 
to impose time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, 
see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
  We agree 
with Kendall. 
                                                 
7 Because this case involves a sitting judge’s speech 
about one of his pending cases, we need not decide the 
constitutional standard for evaluating judicial speech in 
other contexts, such as a speech about a case over which 
he is not presiding or about topics unrelated to any 
pending case.  Cf., e.g., Miss. Comm’n on Judicial 
Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006, 1011–12 
(Miss. 2004) (en banc) (applying strict scrutiny to a 
state’s decision to discipline a judge for his extra-judicial 
statements on gay rights); In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 33 
(W.Va. 1994) (“A judge may not be disciplined 
consistent with the  First Amendment . . . for his remarks 
during a radio interview in which he discussed his own 
disciplinary proceedings, criticized a member of his 
investigative panel, and stated his intention to take some 
reactive and lawful measure against the panel member.”). 
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(1989), make reasonable, content-based decisions about 
what speech is allowed on government property that is 
not fully open to the public, see Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1998), decide 
what viewpoints to espouse in its own speech or speech 
that might be attributed to it, see Johanns v. Livestock 
Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560 (2005), and categorically 
restrict unprotected speech.8
                                                 
8 Examples of categorically unprotected speech include 
obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 
(1973), child pornography, see New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 764–65 (1982), advocacy that imminently 
incites lawless action, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam), fighting words, see 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942), true threats, see Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam), commercial speech that is 
false, misleading, or proposes illegal transactions, see 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562, 566–67 (1980), and some 
false statements of fact, see generally United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012).  
  Sometimes, however, the 
government acts in a capacity that goes beyond merely 
being sovereign, and it gains additional authority to 
regulate speech in those capacities.  See, e.g., Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419–20 (2006) (government as 
public employer); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
369–97 (2007) (government as K-12 educator); Gentile v. 
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State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1066, 1075 (1991) 
(government as regulator of attorneys); Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (government as prison 
administrator); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
748–49 (1978) (government as regulator of broadcast 
radio and television); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–
59 (1974) (government as military commander). 
In the realm of speech about ongoing judicial 
proceedings, the government’s authority as sovereign 
provides only limited power to criminally punish speech 
by those outside the judicial system.  As the Supreme 
Court made clear in a trio of cases involving members of 
the press held in criminal contempt for their news stories, 
speech about ongoing judicial proceedings is criminally 
punishable only if it poses a clear and present danger of 
obstructing or prejudicing the ongoing proceedings.  
Craig, 331 U.S. at 372; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 
331, 348 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 
260–63 (1941); see also Standing Comm. on Discipline 
of U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 
F.3d 1430, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995).  The government has 
greater authority to discipline speech about an ongoing 
judicial proceeding, though, when the speaker is an 
attorney involved in that proceeding.  See Gentile, 501 
U.S. at 1075.    Because the attorney is likely to be 
viewed as “especially authoritative” and his statements 
are more “likely to influence the actual outcome of the 
trial,” the government has an overriding interest in 
30 
 
limiting the attorney’s prejudicial comments to preserve 
the litigants’ constitutional rights to an impartial jury.  Id. 
at 1074–75.  Consequently, the attorney’s speech is 
subject to discipline at a lower threshold: when it is 
substantially likely to prejudice the proceedings.  Id. at 
1075.  
That brings us to the question in this case: does the 
government’s broader authority to discipline attorney 
speech about ongoing proceedings also permit the 
government to hold a judge in criminal contempt for his 
speech about ongoing proceedings?  We answer that 
question with a resounding “No.”  Criminal contempt is 
no mere disciplinary tool.  It derives, like all crimes, from 
a government’s power as sovereign.  See Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 565–66 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“[A] court’s broad power to discipline attorneys as 
officers of the court for misconduct not properly 
categorized as contempt is substantially different from 
the contempt power.”); Cammer v. United States, 350 
U.S. 399, 408 n.7 (1956) (“‘The power to disbar an 
attorney proceeds upon very different grounds’ from 
those which support a court’s power to punish for 
contempt.” (quoting Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 
Wall.) 505, 512 (1873))); see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 
826 (describing criminal contempt as “a crime in the 
ordinary sense” (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 
201 (1968)).   Because the government’s use of the 
criminal-contempt power is the sine qua non of a 
31 
 
sovereign act, the government has no greater authority to 
hold someone in criminal contempt for their speech about 
ongoing proceedings than it would to criminally punish 
any speech.  The government’s additional authority to 
discipline attorney speech is therefore inapposite.  And 
that means the speech must present a clear and present 
danger—not just a substantial likelihood—of obstructing 
the administration of justice.  Consequently, the First 
Amendment protects a judge’s opinion from criminal 
punishment unless his speech poses a clear and present 
danger to the administration of justice.9
                                                 
9 The Supreme Court has not yet been asked to resolve 
whether or how Garcetti’s government-employer 
rationale extends to disciplinary restrictions on a judge’s 
on-the-job speech.  See White, 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“Whether the rationale of [our public-
employee-speech cases] could be extended to allow a 
general speech restriction on sitting judges—regardless 
of whether they are campaigning—in order to promote 
the efficient administration of justice, is not an issue 
raised here.”); see also In re Vincent, 172 P.3d at 608 
(“[E]valuating the constitutionality of restrictions on the 
political speech of a judge does not fit neatly into the 
existing analytical framework for First Amendment 
analysis.  Selecting the appropriate framework for 
analysis has become even more difficult since White.”)  
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The People, however, argue that Kendall’s opinion 
should receive no constitutional protection from criminal 
punishment.  See People’s Br. at 15–16.  The People 
analogize the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s authority 
to punish lower-court judges’ speech to the government’s 
broad authority as public employer to discipline an 
employee for speech made pursuant to his official duties, 
see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421, and to the government’s 
broad authority as military commander to punish an 
officer’s insubordinate speech towards his superiors, see 
United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967). 
These analogies fall flat.  As we have already 
explained, contempt is not discipline: the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court acted as sovereign, not as public 
employer, by criminally punishing Kendall’s speech.  
And the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s supervisory 
capacity over lower-court judges is hardly similar to the 
government’s capacity as military commander.  The 
Supreme Court has long differentiated military-speech 
restrictions from those in the civilian community based 
on considerations unique to the military.  See, e.g., 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“Our 
review of military regulations challenged on First 
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than 
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations 
                                                                                                             
Since that question is not implicated here, we leave it for 
another day. 
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designed for civilian society.  The military need not 
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that 
such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First 
Amendment[.]”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 
(1974) (“The armed forces depend on a command 
structure that at times must commit men to combat, not 
only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving the 
security of the Nation itself.  Speech that is protected in 
the civil population may nonetheless undermine the 
effectiveness of response to command.  If it does, it is 
constitutionally unprotected.” (citations omitted)).  Those 
same considerations have no force in a civilian court 
system: Superior courts do not depend on an instinctive 
obedience to command structure that is critical to 
executing split-second battlefield orders.  Nor do court 
systems have a similar need to restrict the role of 
dissent—unlike the military, the judicial mission depends 
on courts being deliberative bodies.  Cf. United States v. 
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890) (“An army is not a 
deliberative body.  It is the executive arm.  Its law is that 
of obedience.  No question can be left open as to the right 
to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the 
soldier.”). 
 In summary, the First Amendment prevents the 
government from criminally punishing a sitting judge’s 
speech about one of his pending cases unless it poses a 
clear and present danger to the administration of 
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justice.10
                                                 
10 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court did not base 
Kendall’s conviction on a conclusion that his words were 
defamatory.  See Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. 
Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 
1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It follows that statements 
impugning the integrity of a judge may not be punished 
unless they are capable of being proved true or false 
. . . .”)  And no such conclusion would be possible here.  
Contrary to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s 
characterization, Kendall’s remarks cannot be reasonably 
interpreted as “blatantly accus[ing], without proof, the 
Justices . . . of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and 
of committing illegal acts.”  Kendall’s statements were 
nothing more than “rhetorical hyperbole” using language 
in a “loose, figurative sense” and therefore cannot be 
interpreted as asserting actual facts about the Justices.  
Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 
284–85 (1974); see also id. at 286 (holding that a union 
newsletter’s description of a “scab” as a “traitor” could 
not be construed as a factual assertion); Greenbelt Coop. 
Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding 
that a description of a public figure’s negotiating position 
as “blackmail” could not be construed as charging the 
plaintiff with committing a crime). 
  Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 
(2010) (“If the First Amendment has any force, it 
prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or 
associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political 
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speech.”).   
B. 
We must vacate Kendall’s conviction because his 
opinion did not pose a clear and present danger of 
prejudicing the ongoing Ford proceedings.  In the usual 
course of reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we 
“review the record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt based on the available evidence.”  United States v. 
Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Jackson 
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).  But “in cases raising 
First Amendment issues,” we have an “obligation to 
‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ 
in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression.’”  Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1038 (quoting Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
499 (1984)).  Consequently, we are “compelled to 
examine for [ourselves] the statements in issue and the 
circumstances under which they were made to see 
whether or not they do carry” the requisite threat to the 
administration of justice.  Id. (quoting Pennekamp, 328 
U.S. at 335); see also United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 
825, 834 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Suffice it to say that in First 
Amendment cases, we must scrutinize carefully the lower 
Whether Kendall’s Opinion Crossed the 
Constitutional Line 
36 
 
court’s application of the relevant standards to the facts 
at hand.”). 
As we have explained, obstruction of the 
administration of justice contemplates interference with 
“the pendency of some sort of judicial proceeding.”  
United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 
1975).  But obstruction of the administration of justice 
should “not be confused with obstruction of justice.  
Justice may be obstructed by mere inaction, but 
obstruction of the administration of justice requires 
something more—some act that will interrupt the orderly 
process of the administration of justice, or thwart the 
judicial process.”  United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 
113, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Ex parte Hudgings, 
249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919)); compare In re Michael, 326 
U.S. 224, 228 (1945) (“[P]erjury alone does not 
constitute an ‘obstruction’ [of the administration of 
justice]  . . . [and] there ‘must be added to the essential 
elements of perjury under the general law the further 
element of obstruction to the Court in the performance of 
its duty.’” (quoting Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 384)), 
with Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933) 
(concluding that a prospective juror who committed 
perjury had also obstructed the administration of justice 
because she had falsely testified to qualify for the jury 
even though she was biased and would acquit the 
defendant no matter what the evidence showed).  And to 
transgress the threshold of clear and present danger, the 
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speech must “constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, 
threat to the administration of justice.  The danger must 
not be remote or even probable; it must immediately 
imperil.”  Craig, 331 U.S. at 376.   
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two 
theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear 
and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case.  
Neither passes muster.   
According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, 
Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the 
very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” 
by “blatantly accus[ing], without proof, the Justices . . . 
of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of 
committing illegal acts.”  Yet Kendall’s criticism of the 
decision to issue mandamus—even if it unfairly 
impugned the Justices’ motives—is simply not enough.  
His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] 
ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a 
writ of mandamus.  Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding 
that “criticism of judicial action already taken,” even 
though “the cases were still pending on other points or 
might be revived by rehearings,” was not enough to 
satisfy the clear-and-present-danger standard).  And the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s interests in “protecting 
the reputation of its judges” and “maintaining [its] 
institutional integrity” are insufficient “to justify the 
subsequent [criminal] punishment of speech.”  Landmark 
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Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841–42 
(1978). 
Nor, as the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
intimated, did Kendall’s opinion delay or otherwise 
prejudice the criminal case against Ford and Paris.  
According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, 
Kendall’s opinion delayed the Ford trial by prompting 
the defendants to petition this Court for a writ of 
certiorari to review the mandamus decision. 
The evidence unequivocally contradicts that 
account.  The defendants’ mere filing of a petition for 
certiorari in this Court did not and could not have stayed 
their trial. See Brewer v. Quarterman, 474 F.3d 207, 210 
(5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting from the 
majority’s exercise of jurisdiction) (explaining that while 
the granting of a petition for certiorari stays a case in the 
lower court, the filing of a petition for certiorari does not 
do so).  Although the government moved to continue the 
Ford trial on November 23, 2009, to await a ruling on the 
defendants’ petition, this Court had already denied the 
defendants’ petition several days earlier on November 
17, 2009.  Judge Carroll (who ultimately presided over 
the Ford trial) nevertheless continued the trial at the 
defendants’ request because some key defense witnesses 
either could not be located or were off-island.  
Furthermore, even if there were some evidence that the 
defendants’ petition delayed the trial, the Virgin Islands 
39 
 
Supreme Court did not identify any evidence that 
Kendall’s opinion caused the defendants to seek review 
of the mandamus decision by petitioning for certiorari.  
The record simply contains no support for the conclusion 
that Kendall’s opinion delayed the Ford trial.  Accord 
Scarfo, 263 F.3d at 95 (reversing a gag order on an 
attorney’s speech about an ongoing case because there 
was no “evidence that [his] statements to the press 
jeopardized the fairness of the trial or in any way 
materially impaired or prejudiced the judicial power of 
the court”). 
The People offer an additional argument about 
how Kendall’s opinion prejudiced the Ford case.  
According to the People, Kendall “deliberately 
contaminated the jury pool” by “publicly argu[ing] that 
the People lacked sufficient evidence to convict the Ford 
defendants,” directly resulting in Paris’s acquittal.  
People’s Br. at 19.  This is pure conjecture, and as 
conjecture it is belied by the fact that Judge Carroll was 
ultimately able to select an impartial jury for Ford’s trial.  
More importantly, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court did 
not rely on this theory in convicting Kendall.  Nor can 
we.  Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472–73 (1965) 
(holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial 
by jury requires the jury to base its verdict only on the 
evidence presented at trial); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance 
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 468 (1993) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Unlike a legislature, whose judgments may 
40 
 
be predicated on educated guesses and need not 
necessarily be grounded in facts adduced in a hearing, a 
jury is bound to consider only the evidence presented to 
it in arriving at a judgment.” (internal citations omitted)). 
On the whole, Kendall’s opinion contained “strong 
language, intemperate language, and, we assume, an 
unfair criticism.  But a judge may not hold in contempt 
one ‘who ventures to publish anything that tends to make 
him unpopular or belittle him.’”  Craig, 331 U.S. at 376 
(quoting Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 281 (1923) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also In re Little, 404 U.S. 
553, 556 (1972) (overturning lawyers’ contempt 
convictions where “[t]heir convictions rest[ed] on 
nothing whatever except allegations [they] made in 
motions for change of venue and disqualification of [the 
judge] because of [his] alleged bias,” and noting that the 
lawyers had not “disobeyed any valid court order, talked 
loudly, acted boisterously, or attempted to prevent the 
judge or any other officer of the court from carrying on 
his court duties” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)).  Consequently, Kendall’s controversial 
remarks in the Ford opinion were protected by the First 
Amendment and cannot sustain his conviction on Count 
1.   
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III. 
On Count 2, Kendall was charged and convicted of 
indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with the 
writ of mandamus.  This conviction fails, however, 
because it is not supported by sufficient evidence. 
Like any crime, a conviction for criminal contempt 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Young v. 
United States, 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987).  And like any 
criminal prosecution, we review the sufficiency of the 
evidence de novo.  United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 
154 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Brodie, 403 
F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)).  In doing so, we 
“‘examine the totality of the evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial,’ and ‘interpret the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government as the verdict winner.’”  
United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60, 
62 (3d Cir. 2008)).  If “all the pieces of evidence, taken 
together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find [the 
defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” then we 
must uphold the jury’s verdict.  Brodie, 403 F.2d at 134 
(quoting United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 
(3d Cir. 1987)). 
Criminal contempt generally requires the existence 
of a valid court order that the defendant knew of and 
willfully disobeyed.  Doral Produce Corp. v. Paul 
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Steinberg Assoc., Inc., 347 F.3d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2003); 
see also FTC v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 624 F.3d 575, 582 
(3d Cir. 2010) (discussing civil contempt).  This 
willfulness requirement distinguishes civil contempt from 
criminal contempt and requires “a specific intent to 
consciously disregard an order of the court or where the 
defendant knows or should reasonably be aware” that he 
is disregarding the order.  Doral Produce Corp., 347 F.3d 
at 38 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 
Waste Conversion, 893 F.2d at 610.  Because of this 
willfulness requirement, good-faith compliance is a 
defense to criminal contempt but not civil contempt: “if 
the defendant’s alleged disobedience is consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of the court’s order . . . and 
there is no other evidence of willfulness, we would be 
unable to affirm the conviction.”  Doral Produce Corp., 
347 F.3d at 38–39. 
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court charged 
Kendall with disobeying the writ of mandamus in two 
ways: (1) by refusing to consider a change of venue or a 
continuance to minimize pretrial publicity; (2) by 
refusing to schedule the Ford case for trial and recusing 
himself instead of proceeding to trial (in the absence of a 
valid plea agreement).  These two grounds, however, 
suffer from a similar defect: the writ of mandamus did 
not require Kendall to take any action with respect to 
these issues.  Consequently, there is insufficient evidence 
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that Kendall disobeyed any unambiguous term of the writ 
of mandamus. 
A. 
As the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
acknowledged, the writ of mandamus “did not itself 
direct Kendall to consider a postponement or change of 
venue.”  The Virgin Islands Supreme Court nonetheless 
determined that the writ “precluded Kendall from 
concluding” that the Ford defendants could not obtain a 
fair trial “without first considering a change of venue or a 
postponement.”  Id. 
Refusal to Consider Alternatives to Minimize 
Pretrial Publicity 
Kendall did not, however, ignore the writ’s 
requirement that he consider ways to minimize pretrial 
publicity as part of any ruling on pretrial publicity 
because he never ruled on this issue.  Rather, Kendall left 
this question open for his successor to decide.  To be 
sure, his opinion describes his continued belief that 
“widespread publicity” disclosing the defendants’ earlier 
willingness to plead guilty “virtually foreclosed the 
selection of [a fair and impartial] jury in [the territory’s] 
very small population.”  But his opinion does so only to 
explain some of the concerns motivating his recusal—not 
as part of any ruling on whether the pretrial publicity had 
violated the defendants’ right to a fair trial.  
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Consequently, Kendall’s discussion of pretrial publicity 
did not violate the writ. 
B. 
Likewise, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
conceded that the writ of mandamus did not “state that 
Kendall was forbidden from recusing himself and was 
required to immediately proceed to trial.”  Kendall 
therefore cannot be held in contempt for recusing himself 
rather than proceeding to trial. 
Recusal Instead of Proceeding to Trial 
The Virgin Islands Supreme Court convicted him 
on Count 2 anyway.  It concluded that Kendall was guilty 
because his recusal was a pretext to avoid complying 
with the writ, even though pretextual recusal would not 
violate the writ.11
                                                 
11 Count 2 charged Kendall with violating the writ of 
mandamus by recusing himself, but the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court ultimately convicted him of pretextually 
recusing himself even though his recusal did not violate 
the writ.  This shift in theories raises a serious question as 
to whether Kendall was unconstitutionally convicted of a 
crime with which he was not charged.  See United States 
v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 532 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Because 
of [the Fifth Amendment], ‘a court cannot permit a 
defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the 
indictment against him.’” (quoting Stirone v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 212, 216 (1960))); United States v. 
  The Special Master concluded that the 
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evidence was at least “equally consistent with the 
premise that Kendall recused himself because he believed 
Bethel had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and [that 
he] ‘could not, and ethically should not, render decisions 
in the case.’”  V.I. S. Ct. Op. at 24.  The Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court rejected the Special Master’s assessment 
for one reason: the timing of Kendall’s recusal.  
According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, all of 
Kendall’s reasons for recusal arose by March 9, 2009, yet 
Kendall “continued to issue rulings” in People v. Ford 
after that date, and waited until after the writ issued 
months later to recuse himself.  Id. at 26.  So the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court concluded that the timing of 
Kendall’s decision revealed the real reason for his 
recusal: his disagreement with the writ of mandamus.  Id. 
That theory fails on its own terms.  Its premise—
that all of Kendall’s reasons for recusal arose before the 
writ was issued—is contradicted by the evidence.  While 
Bethel made several misrepresentations to Kendall before 
the writ of mandamus was issued, the last straw came 
after the writ issued: Bethel proffered evidence in support 
                                                                                                             
Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (“‘The key 
inquiry is whether the defendant was convicted of the 
same conduct for which he was indicted.’” (quoting 
United States v. Robles-Vertiz, 155 F.3d  725, 729 (5th 
Cir. 1998))).  Nevertheless, we do not consider this issue 
because Kendall has not raised it.   
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of the plea agreement for voluntary manslaughter that 
tended to exculpate the defendants and confirm their self-
defense theory.  Even though Bethel’s factual basis was 
insufficient to support the plea agreement for voluntary 
manslaughter, Bethel forged ahead toward trial on more 
serious charges requiring proof of intent—an element 
contradicted by Bethel’s own previous account of the 
evidence.  And he pressed forward despite his “serious 
doubt” about the evidentiary support for those more 
serious charges.  This post-writ conduct led Kendall to 
conclude that Bethel was unethically trying to “win a 
conviction rather than seeing that justice is done” and 
that he was no longer able “to accord much credence to 
[Bethel’s] further representations” in the Ford case.  As a 
result, there is not “substantial evidence that, when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the [People], would 
allow a rational trier of fact” to conclude that Kendall’s 
recusal was pretextual.12
                                                 
12 Kendall also argues that the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court lacked authority to hold him in criminal contempt 
for pretextual recusal where his recusal did not violate 
any court order.  Because we conclude that Kendall’s 
conviction on Count 2 was not supported by sufficient 
evidence, we need not consider whether the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court was “inescapably wrong” about 
the scope of its contempt power.  Defoe v. Phillip, 702 
F.3d 735, 744 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that our limited 
oversight over the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
  United States v. Wright, 665 
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F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
Because none of the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s grounds are sufficient to demonstrate Kendall’s 
willful non-compliance with the writ of mandamus, we 
must vacate his conviction on Count 2. 
IV. 
 On Count 3, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
convicted Kendall of indirect criminal contempt for 
misbehaving in his official transactions based on the 
conduct underlying Counts 1 and 2.  As the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court explained, “the disposition of the 
obstruction of administration of justice and failure to 
comply charges also dictates the disposition of 
misbehaving in official transactions charge.”  V.I. S. Ct. 
Op. at 28.  Consequently, our reversal of Kendall’s 
convictions on Counts 1 and 2 requires us to reverse his 
conviction on Count 3. 
 
                                                                                                             
“requires us to affirm [its] decisions . . . that are based on 
territorial law unless those decisions are inescapably 
wrong”).  Nevertheless, we note that, so far as we can 
find, no court has ever used its limited contempt 
authority to punish a judge’s pretextual recusal absent the 
violation of a court order. 
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V. 
 Lastly, Kendall argues that the Justices violated his 
right to due process in two ways: First, the Justices did 
not recuse themselves from presiding over his contempt 
charges.  Second, the Justices, acting as the ultimate fact-
finders in his case, convicted him without personally 
attending his trial and observing the witnesses while they 
testified.  Because Kendall’s convictions were 
unconstitutional and based on insufficient evidence, we 
need not reach his due-process arguments. 
* * * * * 
 We take no issue with the Virgin Islands Supreme 
Court’s well-intentioned desire to promote respect for the 
judiciary.  Nowhere is such respect more important than 
among judges, who “have a common interest, as 
members of the judiciary, in getting the law right,” and 
who, “as a result, . . . are willing to listen, persuade, and 
be persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and 
respect.”  Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality 
on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 
1645 (2003).  Whatever its substantive merit, Kendall’s 
Ford opinion gratuitously undermined the collegial 
judicial atmosphere “that helps to create the conditions 
for principled agreement, by allowing all points of view 
to be aired and considered.”  Id.  But as Justice Black 
explained: 
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The assumption that respect for the judiciary 
can be won by shielding judges from 
published criticism wrongly appraises the 
character of American public opinion.  For it 
is a prized American privilege to speak 
one’s mind, although not always with 
perfect good taste, on all public institutions.  
And an enforced silence, however limited, 
solely in the name of preserving the dignity 
of the bench, would probably engender 
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much 
more than it would enhance respect. 
Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270–71; see also Landmark 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 839 (“[T]he law gives 
‘[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions . . . no 
greater immunity from criticism than other persons or 
institutions.’” (quoting Bridges, 314 U.S. at 289 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).  We will reverse the 
judgment of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court and vacate 
all of Kendall’s convictions. 
 
 
In re:  KENDALL 
 
No. 11-4471 
 
          
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 I join this Court’s judgment reversing the criminal 
contempt conviction against Judge Kendall.  I write 
separately, however, to express my view that the contempt 
conviction should be reversed on the grounds of absolute 
judicial immunity.
, concurring:  
 
1  It is well-established that absolute 
judicial immunity protects judges from civil suit for judicial 
actions within their jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 
502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357-
62 (1978).  I believe that, absent corruption or bribery, such 
protection should also reach criminal liability for judicial 
actions within the judge’s jurisdiction.2
                                                          
1 Because I believe that the issue of judicial immunity falls 
within the scope of the second issue on which we granted 
certiorari—whether the Virgin Islands Supreme Court erred 
in imposing criminal contempt on the charges of failure to 
comply with its mandamus order—and because it is an issue 
of great importance, I address the issue in this concurrence.   
 
 
2 To be sure, to the extent that offenses like corruption and 
bribery are not judicial acts within a judge’s jurisdiction, they 
do not fall within this proposed extension of the doctrine of 
judicial immunity. See Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 
888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945) (noting that a judge “may be held 
criminally responsible when he acts fraudulently or 
2 
 
 
“As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court recognized 
that it was ‘a general principle of the highest importance to 
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in 
exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be free to act 
upon his own convictions, without apprehensions of personal 
consequences to himself.’”  Stump, 435 U.S. at 355 (quoting 
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)).  Rooted in 
English common law, the doctrine of judicial immunity is 
aimed primarily at preserving judicial independence.  See 
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (citing Bradley, 
80 U.S. at 348) (noting that judicial immunity historically was 
also a device for discouraging collateral attacks and 
protecting the finality of judgments); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 
547, 554 (1967) (“This immunity . . . ‘is not for the protection 
or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit 
of the public, whose interest it is that judges should be at 
liberty to exercise their functions with independence and 
without fear of consequences.’”) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 
L.R. 3, Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley, 80 U.S. at 
349); United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 926, 933 (S.D. 
Cal. 1944) (“The immunity which has clothed judges for a 
century and a half in our country found its genesis in the 
English common law simultaneously with the independence 
of the judiciary.”). 
                                                                                                                                  
corruptly”); McFarland v. Nebraska, 109 N.W.2d 397, 403 
(Neb. 1961) (“[A]ny judicial officer who acts fraudulently or 
corruptly is responsible criminally, whether he acts under the 
law or without the law.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  I include the qualifier of “absent corruption 
or bribery,” however, to ensure that such criminal acts by 
judges will not be covered by judicial immunity.   
3 
 
In the civil context, “[a] long line of th[e] Court’s 
precedents acknowledge that, generally, a judge is immune 
from a suit for money damages.”  Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9.  
There are only two circumstances in which the doctrine of 
judicial immunity does not apply to civil suits for money 
damages:  (1) “a judge is not immune from liability for 
nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s 
judicial capacity” and (2) “a judge is not immune for action, 
though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 11.   
 
While the application of absolute judicial immunity in 
civil proceedings is well-established, the Supreme Court has 
noted in dicta that it has not recognized absolute judicial 
immunity from criminal liability.  See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9 
n.1 (“The Court, however, has recognized that a judge is not 
absolutely immune from criminal liability . . . .”); O’Shea v. 
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (“[W]e have never held 
that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or 
executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization 
of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights. . . .  
On the contrary, the judicially fashioned doctrine of official 
immunity does not reach so far as to immunize criminal 
conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. . . .”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).3, 4
                                                          
3 To the extent that I propose that judges not be exempt from 
prosecution for the offenses of bribery or corruption, my 
position is consistent with that of the Supreme Court. 
 
   
4 In Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1878), the Supreme 
Court did deny judicial immunity to a judge indicted for 
excluding black citizens from jury lists in violation of the 
4 
 
Still, some federal district courts and state courts have 
found judges to be judicially immune from criminal charges 
relating to the performance of judicial duties.  See Chaplin, 
54 F. Supp. at 934-35 (sustaining a judge’s plea at bar that he 
should be immune from indictment and prosecution for 
depriving a citizen of civil rights “under the color of any law” 
in judicial proceedings in his court); In re Petition of Dwyer, 
406 A.2d 1355, 1360 (Pa. 1979) (finding “that the petitioners 
are quasi-judicial and/or quasi-prosecutorial officers . . . [and] 
in the absence of allegations of bad faith or corruption, the 
petitioners, in granting the extensions and variance, are 
insulated from criminal prosecution for the consequences of 
their actions”); Commonwealth v. Tartar, 239 S.W.2d 265, 
266-67 (Ky. App. 1951) (holding that the circuit court 
properly sustained a demurrer to the indictment of a judge for 
misfeasance in office because “judges acting in their official 
capacities should be protected from harassment by either civil 
suits or criminal prosecutions”); In re McNair, 187 A. 498, 
502 (Pa. 1936) (finding that magistrate judges “cannot be 
subjected to liability, civil or criminal, for any of their judicial 
acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good 
faith”). 
 
I believe that, absent bribery or corruption, the 
importance of judicial independence warrants application of 
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity to criminal liability 
for judicial acts performed within a judge’s jurisdiction.  
Exposing judges to criminal liability for judicial acts 
performed within their jurisdiction poses the same type of 
                                                                                                                                  
Civil Rights Act of 1875.  However, the Court did so on the 
grounds that the act in question was ministerial, not judicial.  
Id. at 348. 
5 
 
threat to judicial independence as does exposing them to civil 
suit for money damages.  As the courts that have found 
judges immune from criminal prosecution have noted, fear of 
criminal prosecution for judicial acts, like fear of civil suits 
by disgruntled litigants, could affect the ability of judges to 
act on their own convictions in fulfilling their judicial duties.  
See, e.g., Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. at 934 (“If judges are protected 
against civil actions for judicial acts, the reasons are more 
weighty that they should be protected against criminal 
actions.”); Dwyer, 406 A.2d at 1361 (“Judges made timid 
because of fear of criminal prosecutions for errors in their 
decisions make poor public servants.”); Tartar, 239 S.W.2d at 
266 (“[O]therwise judges might be unduly burdened 
defending charges instigated by other governmental officers 
or aggrieved members of the public.”). 
 
Moreover, as courts have noted with respect to judicial 
immunity from civil suits, there are other means of 
disciplining judges that do not pose such a threat to the 
independence of the judiciary.  Judges are subject to removal.  
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4; V.I.S.CT.R. 209.6; Bradley, 80 
U.S. at 354 (“But for malice or corruption in their action 
whilst exercising their judicial functions within the general 
scope of their jurisdiction, judges of these courts can only be 
reached by public prosecution in the form of impeachment, or 
in such other form as may be specially prescribed.”).  Judges 
also are subject to disciplinary controls:  all states now have 
judicial commissions to review complaints of judicial 
misconduct, and there are procedures within the federal courts 
for such review as well.5
                                                          
5 The majority notes that “superior courts routinely used their 
contempt power to hold inferior judges accountable for 
  See John O. Haley, The Civil, 
6 
 
Criminal and Disciplinary Liability of Judges, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 281, 288-89 (2006).  The Virgin Islands also has a 
judicial commission, the Commission on Judicial Conduct.  
V.I.S.CT.R. 209.6
The majority asserts, however, that there is “no 
support in history, law, or logic” for extending judicial 
immunity to criminal contempt.  Ante at 24 n.4.  The majority 
cites to Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) for support.  
Ante at 23 n.4.  However, in Pulliam, the Supreme Court held 
    
 
                                                                                                                                  
violating their writs and orders . . . .”  Ante at 22 n.4.    
However, the majority cites only to cases from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and recognizes that 
this practice was common only until the mid-twentieth 
century when codes of judicial conduct and judicial 
disciplinary commissions were created.  Ante at 22-23 n.4. 
 
6 Complaints arising out of other cases had been filed against 
Judge Kendall with the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s 
predecessor, the Commission on Judicial Disabilities.  The 
Commission on Judicial Disabilities was nullified by this 
Court’s decision in Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 
2009), in which we found that the provisions of the 
legislature’s act allowing the Commission to remove judges 
violated the separation of powers principle in the Revised 
Organic Act that served as the Constitution of the Virgin 
Islands.  This decision was published on July 13, 2009.  On 
December 10, 2009, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
adopted Supreme Court Rule 209, which created the new 
judicial disciplinary body, the Commission of Judicial 
Conduct.  V.I.S.CT.R. 209; V.I.S.CT., Promulgation No. 
2009-01 (Dec. 10, 2009).   
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only that judicial immunity “is not a bar to prospective 
injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial 
capacity” or to an award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 
1988.7  466 U.S. at 541-42.  The Court did not directly 
address whether judicial immunity should bar criminal 
contempt proceedings against a judge.  Nevertheless, Justice 
Powell, in dissent, voiced concern that “[t]he specter of 
contempt proceedings for alleged violations of injunctive 
orders is likely to inhibit unbiased judicial decisionmaking as 
much as the threat of liability for damages.”8
                                                          
7 It is noteworthy that after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pulliam, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement 
Act of 1996, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bar 
injunctive relief against a judicial officer “unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable” and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to bar an award of costs, 
including attorney’s fees, against a judicial officer in any 
action “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial 
capacity . . . , unless such action was clearly in excess of such 
officer’s jurisdiction.”  Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988). 
 
8 The majority asserts that the Pulliam Court rejected Justice 
Powell’s dissenting argument about the danger that the threat 
of contempt proceedings poses to judicial independence.  
Ante at 23 n.4.  I believe that this is an overstatement of the 
Court’s position:  the Court noted that a judge “risks 
contempt for violating the writ [of mandamus]” but did not 
directly respond to Justice Powell’s argument about the effect 
that the threat of contempt proceedings could have on judicial 
independence.  Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 538 n.19. 
 
  Id. at 555 
8 
 
(Powell, J., dissenting).  I echo Justice Powell’s concern and 
believe that there is a strong basis in common law and logic 
for extending judicial immunity to criminal contempt.9
Here, Judge Kendall should be judicially immune from 
the criminal contempt charges.  In writing the July 7, 2009, 
Opinion recusing himself from the Ford matter, Judge 
Kendall was exercising his judgment as to whether he could 
preside over this case in an impartial and fair manner and 
performing a quintessential judicial function by explaining his 
reasoning in a judicial opinion.  Because this was a judicial 
act within his jurisdiction, he would be immune from civil 
suit arising from the same action.  Just as exposing Judge 
Kendall to civil liability for such an action would threaten his 
ability to act upon his own convictions in performing his 
judicial duties, charging him with criminal contempt for this 
action would also undermine his judicial independence.
 
 
10
                                                          
9 The majority also cites to United States v. Claiborne, 727 
F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1984), United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 
706 (11th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 
1124 (7th Cir. 1974).  Ante at 23-24 n.4.  These cases all 
involve the prosecution of judges for corruption or bribery, 
which are precisely the types of criminal acts that I believe 
should not be covered by judicial immunity.  In Hastings, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted “this is not a case in which a judge is 
prosecuted for acts in his official capacity undertaken in good 
faith.  In such a case, there may exist a common law 
immunity from criminal prosecution.” 681 F.2d at 711 n.12. 
 
   
10 Arguably, if Judge Kendall had recused himself from the 
Ford trial without writing an opinion, he might have been 
held in criminal contempt without a First Amendment 
9 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that the criminal 
contempt conviction here should be reversed on grounds of 
absolute judicial immunity. 
                                                                                                                                  
defense, in which case the issue of judicial immunity could be 
dispositive. 
